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Abstract 
 
In 1979, the Chinese government introduced the One-child Policy for the 
purpose of controlling population growth. Thirty years later, the fertility rate in 
China has declined to a very low level and one-child families have become the 
norm. At the same time, the consequences of low fertility rates have emerged. In 
2015, the government announced a new policy that encouraged couples to have 
two children in order to raise the total fertility rate. In this paper, I analyze the 
economic and legal implications of the Chinese family planning policies. By 
examining to what extent fertility decisions are affected by government policies, 
I evaluate the potential effects of the Two-child Policy. The findings suggest that 
the Two-child Policy might not be effective in increasing the total fertility rate.  
 
Keywords: Family planning policies; China; Two-child Policy; fertility; demand 
for children; family size; number of children 
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5 
Introduction 
 
 With a population of more than 1.35 billion today, China has long been 
one of the most populous countries in the world. After having experienced a 
rapid population growth in the 1950s, the government soon adopted population 
reduction policies to control population growth by encouraging late marriage 
and postponed childbearing. By the late 1970s, controlling population growth 
and increasing GDP per capita had become China’s primary goals under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping. As a result, the One-child Policy was introduced in 
1979 for the purpose of lowering the fertility rate and achieving economic 
prosperity. While regarded by many as “the boldest and largest experiment in 
population control in the history of the world” due to its extensive and strict 
implementation, the One-child Policy successfully reduced the family size in 
China and brought the fertility rate to a historical low in the 1990s1.  
Over the years, many have called for the relaxation of the Chinese family 
planning policies to allow couples to have more than one child. On October 29, 
2015, the Communist Party of China (CPC) announced the new family planning 
policy that encouraged all couples in China to have two children. In the 
announcement, the CPC noted that the demographic structure of China had 
changed dramatically since entering the 21st century.  The CPC pointed out that, 
with the fertility rate dropping significantly, the working age population had 
started to shrink and the elderly were becoming an increasing share of the 
population. This change of policy was aimed to improve the age structure of the 
population, to effectively increase the labor supply, and to ease the pressure of 
                                                        
1 Caven S. McLoughlin, "The coming of age of China's single child policy," 
Psychology in the Schools 42, no. 3 (2005): 312. 
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an aging society. In December 2015, a draft amendment to China’s National Law 
on Population and Family Planning was sent to the national legislative body, the 
National People’s Congress, for review and approval. The amendment was 
passed on December 27, 2015 and came into effect on January 1, 2016, officially 
putting an end to the One-child Policy that had been in place since 1979. 
  Although the law has changed to allow two children in every family, it is 
unclear how much of an effect this change will have on the fertility level. In An 
Economic Analysis of Fertility, Becker pointed out that fertility decisions are 
determined by a variety of factors, such as income, cost of children, and tastes.2 
Thus, while the family planning policies have a large influence on the fertility 
level in China, it is not the only thing that affects fertility decisions. During the 
thirty years in which the One-child Policy was in place, other factors influencing 
fertility decisions might have changed to result in a different ideal family size 
among Chinese families. In this thesis, I aim to understand the nature and the 
size of the impact that the Two-child Policy might have on the fertility decisions 
by analyzing the fertility effects of past family planning polices and taking into 
account other important factors influencing family size decisions in China.  
 
  
                                                        
2 Gary S. Becker, "An economic analysis of fertility," Demographic and economic 
change in developed countries, Columbia University Press, 1960: 211. 
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Literature Review 
 
 
Before I go into analyzing the potential effects of the Two-child Policy, it is 
important to look at previous family planning policies and their impact on the 
fertility level.  In this section, I will provide an overview of the Chinese family 
planning policies with a focus on the One-child Policy and its impact on the 
fertility rate in China. By studying the ways in which the One-child Policy was 
implemented, I hope to show how this policy changed people’s fertility behaviors 
over the years and how it was raised to a legal status before any legislation was 
even adopted. In addition, I will analyze the significance of the adoption of 
Chinese Family Planning Law in 2000. Understanding the implications of 
previous policies will help us better determine how effective the Two-child 
Policy will be in raising the fertility level. 
 
Early Family Planning Policies and Campaigns 
 
 
 In China, the government has launched many family planning programs 
and made policies regarding family sizes since the 1950s. In the three decades 
following the end of the Chinese Civil War and the establishment of People’s 
Republic of China in1949, the country experienced a population explosion due to 
ideological and political reasons. In the early 1950s, the CPC’s leader Mao Ze 
Dong pointed to the need for more workers in agriculture and advocated for 
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larger families.3 The population policy at that time thus encouraged more births 
per family.  Women who gave birth to more babies even received titles of honors. 
As a result, China reached a total fertility rate (TFR)4 as high as 6.3 in 1965, 
compared to a world average of 5 at that time. Within thirty years, China’s 
population increased by more than 260 million.5 However, as the country 
experienced a widespread famine in the early 1960s, the government soon 
realized that the limited arable land would not be able to sustain such fast 
population growth and that population control was needed.  
In the early 1970s, the government launched a new family planning 
campaign to control the population growth.  The slogan wan, xi, shao embodied 
the three important aspects of this new family planning policy: late marriage, 
birth spacing and fewer children.6 The rules were most strictly applied in urban 
cities, where couples were ordered to delay marriage and childbearing until an 
older age (25 for women and 28 for men) and to space out the births of children 
by three to four years. The policy also encouraged a smaller family size by 
limiting the number of children in each family to two or three, depending on the 
region. As a result this campaign, the TFR dropped significantly during the 1970s, 
from 5.9 in 1970 to 2.9 in 1979. As shown in Figure 1, there was a consistent 
decrease in fertility rate throughout the 1970s.  
                                                        
3  Xiaorong Li,  "License to coerce: Violence against women, state responsibility, 
and legal failures in China's family-planning program," Yale JL & Feminism 8 
(1996): 145. 
4 Total fertility rate is the average number of children a woman would have 
throughout her childbearing years.  
5 Skalla, Nicole M, "Chna's One-Child Policy: Illegal Children and the Family 
Planning Law," Brook. J. Int'l L. 30 (2004): 329. 
6 Isabelle Attané, "China's family planning policy: an overview of its past and 
future." Studies in family planning 33, no. 1 (2002): 103. 
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Figure 1. Totally Fertility Rate in China (1960-2015) 
Source: The World Bank 
 
 
The One-child Policy and its implementation 
 
 While the wan, xi, shao policy significantly lowered the fertility level, it 
was not enough to control population growth due to a large population base. By 
the late 1970s, some population specialists had already predicted that this policy 
would fail to meet the State’s official target by 2000, which was to limit the 
population to 1.2 billion.  More importantly, the nation’s population was 
increasing at a rate that was considered as unsustainable compared to the rate of 
economic growth. At that time, China was home to nearly a quarter of the world’s 
population, but it had only seven percent of word’s arable land.7 While 
population increased steadily, the domestic economy was barely growing and 
had a staggering GDP growth rate. This led to a low GDP per capita that was way 
below the world’s average level. As shown in Figure 2, in 1979, China’s GDP per 
                                                        
7 Therese Hesketh, Li Lu, and Zhu Wei Xing, "The effect of China's one-child 
family policy after 25 years," New England Journal of Medicine 353, no. 11 (2005): 
1171. 
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capita was only around $180, while the world average was about $2270.8 
Coming out the Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976 and caused 
serious economic stagnation, the new Party leader Deng Xiaoping was ready to 
initiate an economic reform for the purpose of quickly increasing GDP per capita 
and improving living standards. Thus, lowering birth rate and controlling 
population growth thus became a national priority. 
Figure 2. GDP per capita, China and World Average 
Source: The World Bank 
 
 In order to reach the population goal and to facilitate the economic 
reform, Deng announced a new family planning policy that would promote the 
norm of the one-child family in 1979, known later as the One-child Policy.9 To 
urge couples to follow the policy, the government claimed that “population 
control [was] the most important step toward a higher standard of living”, and 
warned its people that “the only alternative to population control [was] poverty, 
high infant mortality, and malnutrition.”10 In 1980, the Central Party Committee 
                                                        
8 Data obtained from the World Bank database. The definition of the GDP per 
capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population, measured in 
current U.S. dollars. 
9 Li, op. cit., p.148. 
10Ibid., p.150. 
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issued the order stating that each couple may only have one child. The rule was 
then implemented throughout the country. This uniform standard soon faced 
resistance from the people, especially in less developed rural areas where there 
was a need for a large agricultural labor force and where the family size was 
generally bigger than that in urban cities.  
In 1984, the government reconsidered the policy and made changes to 
accommodate the need of different populations. Considering the traditional 
preference for a son and that the number of male labor directly affected the 
family’s livelihood in some places, the new policy allowed a second child in 
families in rural areas if the first child was a girl.11 Moreover, parents who were 
both the only child in their families could have more than one child. In general, 
people of minority groups were also allowed more children, but specific 
regulations depended on the region.12 This led to a diverse policy regime where 
the rules were mostly strictly implemented in urban areas upon those who held 
non-agricultural household registration, but were more flexible in less developed 
rural areas or regions with large minority populations (Figure 3). However, even 
for those who were eligible to have a second child, couples were required to 
apply for second-birth permit with a fee before they plan to conceive a child. 
After obtaining the birth permit, couples were also typically required to wait five 
years after the first birth. 13 
 
                                                        
11 Feng Wang, "Can China afford to continue its one-child policy?" AsiaPacific 
Issues, no.77 (2005): 2.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Skalla, op. cit., 336. 
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Facing strong domestic resistance, the State did not adopt any legislation 
that codified the One-child Policy at the time of its implementation. The 
economic and cultural diversity in China also made it a great challenge for the 
legislature to enact a uniform law to regulate the entire country. However, this 
did not prevent the policy from being implemented successfully. At that time, 
directives from the Communist Party were almost equivalent, if not superior, to 
legislation.14 The absolute leadership of the Communist Party, as one of the four 
cardinal principles, was written into the Constitution, and there was no check on 
the political power of the Party from either the legislative body or the judicial 
branch.15 As a result, policies made by the Party did not merely provide guidance 
for what it wanted the society to achieve as a whole, but were often perceived as 
enforceable laws without having to be approved by the legislature. Moreover, the 
policy did not rely on a functioning court system for its implementation, but was 
directly carried out by Party officials at different levels.  
                                                        
14 Li, op. cit., p150.  
15 Ibid. 
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While no legislation was made to embody the One-child Policy per se, the 
State amended other laws and adopted other legislation to justify the legality of 
the practice of family planning. The 1980 Marriage Law first set out that 
“husband and wife are in duty bound to practice family planning”, making it a 
legal obligation of married couples to follow the policy and practice family 
planning.16 In addition, it required the youngest age at which people could 
register to marry to be 22 years of age for men and 20 for women. Late 
childbearing was also encouraged. In 1982, the 5th National People’s Congress 
adopted the current Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.  The 
amended Constitution states that “[t]he State promotes family planning so that 
population growth may fit the plans for economic and social development” and 
that “[b]oth husband and wife have the duty to practice family planning”, which 
gave the state constitutional power to regulate fertility decisions in families.17 
Nevertheless, neither the amended Constitution nor the Marriage Law explicitly 
said that each couple may only have one child unless they fitted into some 
specific categories.   
Instead, the specifics of the One Child Policy were clarified in central 
government resolutions, directives, and provincial regulations.18 First of all, 
couples needed to obtain birth permits before trying to conceive a child. After 
having the permitted number of children, at least one spouse was required to use 
long-term contraception. In addition, for couples who gave out-of-plan births, 
one spouse was forced to be sterilized.19 Without a specific legislation to regulate 
                                                        
16 Attané, op. cit., p.103. 
17 ibid., p.104. 
18 Skalla, op. cit., p.329. 
19 Skalla, op. cit., p. 336. 
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fertility behaviors, the policy was implemented not according to the rule of law 
but the rule set by party directives. The implementation of the OCP was thus a 
top-down process through which the central government placed serious 
restrictions on the intimate aspects of individual lives.20 A Birth Planning 
Commission was set up at the national level to provide guidance for the 
implementation of the policy.21 Family Planning Commissions were also created 
at the provincial, county and even grass-roots level to oversee family planning 
activities. Through this mechanism, the government designated annul birth 
quotas for each region, and measures were carried out by local officials, party 
leaders, and even informants at workplaces to makes sure that the number of 
births did not exceed the quota. 22  
In general, local authorities and party officials had discretion in deciding 
what measure should be taken to keep births under quotas and to deter 
noncompliance. Economic incentives were provided to urge people to adhere to 
the one-child rule. Those who proceeded with unauthorized pregnancy were 
often forced to abort the child and were subject to severe, sometimes extreme, 
punishment. Stiff fines were charged in cases of non-compliance and couples 
were threatened with disqualification for social benefits in housing, education 
and subsidized child care.23 They also faced the risk of being dismissed from 
employment and losing their income. Moreover, the tightly organized Chinese 
society created a social pressure for people to obey the policy. Psychological 
intimidation and public humiliation existed in many forms, such as public 
                                                        
20 Ibid. 
21 Gabe T. Wang, "China’s population control policy." China Report 32, no. 2 
(1996): 153. 
22Li, op. cit., p.151. 
23Ibid., p.153. 
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postings and monitoring. In extreme cases, violence was used to force 
compliance, including physical abuse and property destruction.24  
Due to its draconian implementation, the One-child Policy was perceived 
to be a law in the Chinese society for a long time even though it did not hold 
formal legal status. While not everyone voluntarily supported the policy, the 
majority of people complied with it and put pressure on those who did not do so. 
However, without codification, this top-down process led to many legal failures. 
As some have pointed out, since government officials were appointed to carry 
out directly the penalties in cases of non-compliance, few opportunities were 
provided for legal representation, hearings, appeals, or judicial review.25 
 
The Impact of the One-child Policy on Family Size 
 
 
Despite the criticism that it received from both domestic and 
international communities, the One-child Policy was effective to some extent in 
controlling population growth and was credited with contributing to two 
decades of rapid per capita economic growth. Although a lot of couples did not 
like the One-child Policy, many people expressed that they did not have a choice 
other than complying with it under the strict scrutiny of family planning 
committees.26 However, many people, mainly urban dwellers, young people 
enrolled in major universities and intellectuals, were also aware of the economic 
                                                        
24Ibid., p.154. 
25Ibid., p.151. 
26 Norah L. Lweis, "Implementing social change: China and the one child policy." 
International Review of Modern Sociology (1987): 245. 
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and social consequences that could result from the problem of overpopulation.27 
Thus, many of them believed that reducing the population was the responsibility 
of all Chinese people and have gradually embodied the policy into their 
behaviors and the new cultural norms.28 
Consequently, the TFR dropped from 2.9 in 1979 to about 1.5 in the late 
90s, below the replacement rate of 2.0, and has remained pretty stable after29. 
According to a survey in 1985, out of 162.3 million married women of 
reproductive age in China, 85.8 percent were practicing birth control.30 In the 
1990s, the age at first marriage among women rose from 22 to 24.31 The 
National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Survey conducted in 2001 
also showed a great reduction in family size.32 The survey interviewed 39,585 
women aged 15 to 49 years from 31 provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities. According to the survey, more than 57 percent of the women 
interviewed had no more than one child. Less than 30 percent had two children. 
In urban areas where the rules were applied more strictly, almost 85 percent of 
the participants had no more than one child. In comparison, families with two 
children were more common in rural areas (about 35 percent). Women aged 
between 20-29 generally had smaller family size (one child or less) not only 
because they were young, but also because the government tightened the 
regulations about the same time as they entered their reproductive years.  For 
                                                        
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29Replacement rate is the rate at which a population exactly replaces itself from 
one generation to the next, without migration. 
30 Wang, op. cit., p.155. 
31 Wang, op. cit., p.4. 
32 Jian Qu Ding and Therese Hesketh. "Family size, fertility preferences, and sex 
ratio in China in the era of the one child family policy: results from national 
family planning and reproductive health survey." BMJ 333, no. 7564 (2006): 371. 
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the same reasons, it was more common for women of aged between 40-49 to 
have larger family size. About 30 percent of the participants that fell into this age 
group had more than three children.    
 
Source: Ding and Hesketh (2006) 
 
Following the economic reform, the government also “voiced its 
commitment to strengthening the rule of law” and put more efforts into 
legislative drafting in many areas of law.33 As people began to accept the one-
child norm and were no longer resistant to the policy, the legislators drafted the 
first family planning law that codified the One-child Policy. As a result, the 
Chinese Family Planning Law was adopted in 2001. The adoption of this law 
confirmed the legal reality in China that the rights of individuals are 
subordinated to the State’s interest and that the State has legal power in 
regulating the “private sphere”, including people’s intimate lives and family 
                                                        
33 Pitman B. Potter, "Legal reform in China: institutions, culture, and selective 
adaptation," Law & Social Inquiry 29, no. 2 (2004): 470. 
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fertility decisions. It also indicated that the practice of family planning was 
already widely accepted by Chinese families and had become an inseparable part 
of the culture.34  
 In summary, the One-child Policy not only greatly influenced people’s 
fertility behaviors, but also changed their intrinsic valuation of children. While 
the new legislation now allows two children in every family, it is unclear whether 
people will choose to have one more child since they are now used to having 
small families. Thus, whether there will be an increase in the number of children 
per family depends on to what extent the decline in fertility rate was caused by 
the family planning polices.  In the following section, I will introduce an 
economic model that explains the factors influencing family size decisions in 
Chinese families in an effort to predict how effective the new policy will be in 
terms of raising fertility rates.  
  
  
                                                        
34 Skalla, op.cit., p.361. 
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Data, Model and Results 
 
In An Economic Analysis of Fertility, Becker laid out an economic 
framework for analyzing the factors that influence the number of children 
parents decide to have in the family.35 In his model, he characterized children as 
a consumer durable because, as opposed to being a one-time payment, the 
expenditure on children is constantly changing as the child grows up.36 He 
pointed out that, similar to other goods, children provide utilities and mainly 
“psychic income” to parents.37 Using a supply and demand model, Becker 
explained that the demand for children depends on both economic factors such 
as income and child costs and non-economic factors such as knowledge of 
contraception, the culture and tastes. According to him, the cost of children is 
simply the present value of input (expected outlays and the imputed value of the 
parents’ services) minus the present value of return (expected money return and 
the imputed value of the child’s services). Moreover, he differentiated between 
the expenditure on children and the cost of children by pointing out that an 
increase in expenditure per children does not necessarily lead to an increase in 
cost because the quality of children also changes when the expenditure per child 
goes up. 38  
Becker’s model was based on the assumption that couples have perfect 
control over both the number of children and spacing of their births. However, as 
I have shown in the previous section, both of these decisions were strictly 
regulated by the State in China. Since the 1980s, the One-child Policy had limited 
                                                        
35 Becker, op. cit., p.210. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., p.213. 
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the number of children, regulated the spacing of children, and established 
penalties for those who did not comply with the policy. In this way, family 
planning policies became one of the most important factors that Chinese families 
would take into consideration when making family size decisions. In this section, 
I will modify and add to Becker’s model to take into account the unique 
circumstances in China in an effort to explain how Chinese couples come to 
decide on the number of children they want in the family. An important thing to 
note here is that, unlike other goods that can be purchased on the market, 
children can only be produced at home in most cases, which makes parents both 
the suppliers and consumers of children. Thus, for my analysis, I will mainly 
focus on the demand side of the equation. 
 
Framework for Analyzing Demand for Children in Chinese Families 
 
Many things can affect the number of children in families in general, 
including both economic and non-economic factors. In my model, I will examine 
a number of factors that are the most important in fertility decisions specific to 
Chinese families. In equation form, the demand for children in Chinese families 
can be represented as: 
Cd = f (family planning polices, income, rearing cost, tastes, demand for 
labor on the farm, …),  
where Cd represents the number of children. By analyzing how and to what 
extent these factors above influence the number of children born to each couple, 
I hope to find out how the Two-child Policy will affect the fertility level. An 
important thing to point out here is that I am focusing on analyzing changes in 
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the quantity of children in Chinese families as opposed to the quality of children 
in my model. As Becker describes, the quality of a child could be characterized as 
the level of living provided to him or her. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the total consumption of children (which takes into account both the 
quantity and quality of children) and the number of children demanded. As I am 
looking at policy effects on the fertility rate, which only captures changes in the 
number of children, I am simply referring to demand for children as the number 
children desired by families in this paper. That being said, I will still consider 
changes in the quality of children as an important component to my analysis 
since if often influences the number of children born to every family. 
 
Family Planning Polices 
 
 As I have explained in the previous section, the success of the One-child 
Policy was built upon a reward-penalty mechanism. Those who refused to 
comply with the policy received fines, and in some cases, lost their jobs and 
social benefits for themselves as well as for their children. As a result, many 
people chose to adhere to the policy because they could not afford the fines or 
losing employment.  However, the monetary cost was not all that burdened the 
couples who wanted more than one child. Couples who proceeded with 
unauthorized pregnancies and had out-of-plan children were often threatened 
with violence and were publicly humiliated. Under such intense social pressure, 
many people who could have afforded the monetary cost of having an additional 
child chose not to do so because of the associated political cost.  
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By imposing serious penalties on those who violated the one-child rule, 
the government was essentially raising the marginal cost of having an additional 
child. Assuming that that the marginal benefit provided by children remains 
constant, the extraordinarily high marginal cost of having a second child forcibly 
reduced the demand for children in Chinese families at each given level of 
income and quality of children. This can be illustrated in the graph below, where 
the horizontal axis represents the number of children and the vertical axis 
represents the net cost of children. Suppose point A represents the level of 
demand for children before the One-child Policy, the increasing net cost of 
children due to the implementation of the policy essentially resulted in a 
movement up along the demand curve from point A to point B, causing the 
demand for children to drop. 
   
 Figure 4. The Effect of the One-child Policy on the Demand for Children 
 
Theoretically, holding other factors constant, when the Two-child Policy 
lowers the marginal cost of having a second child, it should reverse to some 
extent the effect of the One-child Policy. While it is unlikely that the demand 
would return the level when no restriction on the number of children existed, the 
lifting of the one-child rule should still increase the demand by a decent amount. 
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To illustrate this on the graph, we would expect to see a movement down along 
the demand curve to somewhere between point A and B. However, in real life, 
there are many other factors that are influencing the demand for children at the 
same time. During the years in which the One-child Policy was implemented, 
other factors might have changed so much that the demand for children is no 
longer the same as what it was thirty years ago. Therefore, the size of the 
increase in the number of children children as a result of the new policy will 
depend on to what extent is the demand for children affected by other factors.  
 
Income  
 
In most cases, people consume a bigger bundle of goods when there is a 
rise in income. According to Becker, the amount of children consumed in every 
family is also influenced by family income. Holding other things constant, an 
increase in household income will presumably lead to a higher consumption of 
children due to the parents’ increasing ability to afford them.  
Before the economic reform in the 1980s, there was a long period of 
economic stagnation in China, which resulted in a low level of national income 
and GDP per capita. As shown in Figure 2 in the previous section, China’s GDP 
per capita in 1980 was only $193, while the world average at that time was more 
than ten times of that value ($2,500). However, China has experienced 
remarkable economic growth in the past three decades. By 2015, China’s GDP 
per capita reached $7,924. While this was still below the world average ($10,004 
in 2015), the gap between the two has narrowed significantly. With such huge 
increase in income, one would expect the consumption of children to rise over 
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the years. However, a higher consumption of children does not always 
necessarily lead to an increase in the number of children per family. As Becker 
pointed out in his analysis, for consumer durables like cars and houses, people 
tend to purchase more units as well as better quality units at higher income 
levels.39 Similarly, an increase in the amount of children consumed as a result of 
an increase in income can come from a change in the quantity or the quality of 
children, or both. Thus, it could only be said that, at a given quality, the number 
of children will increase as income rises.  
Becker further argued that while an increase in income can lead to both 
an increase in the quantity and the quality of children, the quantity elasticity is 
smaller than the quality elasticity. This is especially true in China’s case, since the 
family planning policy placed a cap on the number of children that families could 
have. As each couple were only allowed to have one or two children, it is 
reasonable to assume that people might want their children to be of higher 
quality and thus were more willing to provide them with better a living and 
learning environment. Therefore, the huge increase in income among Chinese 
families might have translated into an improvement in the quality of children 
rather than an increase in the number of children consumed. In fact, an increase 
in expenditures on children that is often associated with a rise in the quality of 
children can even lead to a lower demand for children by raising the expected 
rearing cost.   
 
                                                        
39 Becker, op. cit., p. 212. 
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Rearing Cost  
 
 The huge increase in income level has led to higher living standards and a 
greater consumption of goods among Chinese families. As the quantity of 
children was limited by the State under the One-child Policy, parents were 
spending more and more on their children with the hope to increase the quality 
of their children. Some researchers have pointed out that parents with the 
financial ability often wanted their children to have the resources and privileges 
that they did not enjoy during their childhood.40 As family size declined over the 
years, parents provided their children with better nutrition, created a better 
environment for the development of their mind and body, and invested more in 
their education and intellectual development.41 This is especially true for 
families with only one child in urban areas.  
In 1999, the China Social Survey Institute carried out a survey regarding 
family’s expenditure on children in three major cities – Beijing, Tianjin and 
Shanghai. As expected, the results indicated that expenditure on children was 
proportional to the level of income. However, in many families, children’s 
consumption took up a significant portion of the income. Among 85% of families 
who participated in the survey, children’s consumption consisted one third or 
more of the family’s income.42 In fact, 35.6% of the families spent about 40% of 
their monthly income on children, and almost 20% of the families spent 50% or 
                                                        
40 Deborah Davis, “The consumer revolution in urban China,” Vol. 22. University 
of California Press, 2000: 179. 
41 Guan Ying, "Consumption patterns of Chinese children," Journal of Family and 
Economic Issues 24, no. 4 (2003): 374. 
42 Ibid. 
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more of the income on children.43 According to the survey, children’s 
consumption level was greater than the adults’ consumption level in many 
families. These numbers indicate that the rearing cost of children has risen to a 
very high level among Chinese families. While the rearing cost of existing 
children increases, the expected rearing cost for an additional child is also 
increasing at the same time, as parents now want “better” children than before. 
Thus, at every income level, parents today might feel that they can only afford 
one or two children since they have a very different standard for how much 
should be spent on each child than they had thirty years ago. As a result, the 
demand for children might have decreased over the years in families at all 
income levels. In addition, as the expectation for expenditures on children 
continues to rise, it is very likely that, when there is a increase in income, parents 
are more inclined to spend that extra money on existing children rather than 
deciding to have more children of lower quality. 
Besides the higher expectation for the quality of children, other things 
could have also raised the rearing cost. For example, in 1986, the National 
People’s Congress passed the Law for Compulsory Education with the goal to 
establish universal nine-year compulsory education and to reduce illiteracy rate, 
especially in rural areas.44 While the government assumed the primary 
responsibility for funding the compulsory education, the cost was shared by 
farmers through a household-based contract responsibility system that was 
established in the late 1970s.45 Although this legislation only made compulsory 
what was already done by most of the parents voluntarily, it did increase the 
                                                        
43 Ibid. 
44 Zhang and Zhao, op. cit., p.263. 
45 Ibid., p.264. 
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rearing cost of children for low-income families in rural areas where some 
parents would not have sent their children to school if not required. Thus, the 
demand for children in these families with limited financial ability could have 
also increased due to such new legislation or policies.  
As children were becoming more and more costly, people might want to 
resort to other goods for acquiring utilities. Thus, it is necessary to look at how 
people’s preferences for goods have changed over the years and how these 
changes can influence the number of children demanded.  
 
Tastes 
 
As Becker explained in his analysis, parents receive utilities from children 
as well as from other goods. Tastes can thus be understood as people’s 
preferences for children relative to other goods. He pointed out that, while no 
goods can be perfect substitutes for children due to the “psychic income” that 
they provide to their parents, certain goods can still be considered as very poor 
substitutes for children.46 In China’s case, consumer preference for children has 
changed significantly since the late 1970s due to changes in domestic 
consumption and cultural values.     
Before the economic reform, China had a planned economy for decades. 
State-owned enterprises distributed social welfare as well as consumer items 
that were unavailable elsewhere, such as movie tickets, fresh fruits and even 
                                                        
46 Becker, op. cit., p.215. 
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apartments.47 Such redistributive practices resulted in relatively homogenous 
living standards within the society, as not many consumer goods were available 
to households due to the lack of a well-functioning, competitive market. 
Research has shown that between 1957 and 1982, families in urban areas spent 
around 58 percent of their income on food and drinks while the work units 
rationed basic necessities.48 The same consumption patterns also existed in rural 
areas where the income level was even lower. Additionally, the socialist ideology 
dictated consumer fashions and discouraged people from buying personal items 
that were deemed as bourgeois and therefore improper for the collective-
centered value system.49 Consequently, the utilities that people could receive 
from other goods were very limited. When Deng Xiaoping initiated the economic 
reform in the early 1980s, he advocated for an open-market economy that 
completely transformed people’s consumer behaviors. With its market-based 
principles, the new economic model allowed private actors and entities to 
contract out some industries that ware owned by the State and encouraged 
entrepreneurship for small businesses.50 As a result, rationing disappeared, and 
market activities took place.  
By the late 1990s, the country had experienced what was called “a 
consumer revolution”, especially in urban areas.51 The rapid increase in income 
and the expansion of marketplace allowed people to live according to their own 
preferences.  This consumer revolution started from a more balanced and 
                                                        
47 Linda, Chao and Ramon H. Myers, "China's consumer revolution: the 1990s 
and beyond." Journal of Contemporary China 7, no. 18 (1998): 357. 
48 Ibid., p.355. 
49 Ibid., p.352. 
50 Ibid., p.357. 
51 Ibid., 364. 
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nutritious diet. People started to include more meat, coarse grains, and even 
seafood in their meals. Moreover, while families used to spend a large portion of 
their income on food and drink, they could then afford to buy more households 
items, such as bicycles, washing machines, computers, and air conditions, and 
more goods for recreational and educational purposes.52  High-income families 
looked for better quality goods and shopped at department stores where 
expensive imported goods were sold. In addition, households were also more 
willing to spend more for personal pleasure. Families frequently ate out at nice 
restaurants, went to karaoke clubs, and went to movies at theaters. Gradually, a 
middle class that enjoyed higher quality of life emerged and set consumer habits 
and fashions for the lower-income class.53 This consumer revolution soon 
resulted in much higher living standards in China, especially in urban areas and 
coastal cities.  
Such improvement in the standard of living significantly changed people’s 
preference for children relative to other goods. As Becker pointed out, parents 
will choose to have an additional child “whenever the expected utility per dollar 
of expected cost from an additional child [are] greater than that from 
expenditure elsewhere.”54 Before the economic reform, which happened about 
the same time when the One-child Policy was implemented, parents consumed 
more children presumably because they received more utilities from them 
compared to other goods of the same cost. This might be due to a lack of other 
consumer goods, a low income level and also a low net cost of children. In the 
early 1980s, the family planning policy increased the marginal cost of a second 
                                                        
52 Ibid., 363. 
53Ibid., 365. 
54Becker, op. cit., p. 216.  
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child while the economic reform created competitive markets where a variety of 
goods were available to consumers at relatively cheaper price. As the consumer 
revolution unfolded, people gradually substituted children with other goods 
from which they could receive the same or even more utilities, especially since 
the rearing cost of children rose significantly over the years. Such change in 
tastes could have caused the demand curve for children to shift in, leading to a 
smaller number of children desired in Chinese families.  
Given the new consumption patterns and different tastes for goods among 
households nowadays, having an additional child means that the parents might 
have to forgo some of the utilities that they receive from other goods and maybe 
sacrifice the current living standard to provide for another child. Assuming that 
the utilities that children provide to their parents remain the same, it is unlikely 
that the parents will be willing to do so.  
 
Demand for Labor in Agriculture 
 
The total fertility rate in China reached as high as more than 6 children 
per woman in the 1950s and 1960s. Such high fertility level was caused by many 
economic, political and cultural reasons. An important factor that contributed to 
such high fertility level was the high demand for labor in agriculture. According 
to data from the World Bank, agriculture comprised over 40 percent of the GDP 
in the late 1960s and remained to be the biggest sector in the Chinese economy 
for a long time. As shown by the graph, employment in agriculture still made up 
more than half of total employment just two decades ago. This is associated with 
the fact that the majority of the population lived in rural areas where there was a 
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lot of arable land and where traditional agricultural activities were the major 
source of income. As shown in Figure 6, more than 80 percent of the population 
lived in rural areas until the 1980s. In these areas, the labor-intensive agriculture 
industry employed a majority of the labor force. Therefore, families in those 
areas wanted more children, especially male children, to meet the high demand 
for labor on the farm. It was also due to this reason that the One-child Policy was 
later revised to allow families in rural areas to have a second child if the first 
child was a girl. As a result, the family size in rural areas was generally larger 
than the family size in urban areas. 
 
 
Figure 5. Employment by sector in China 
Source: World Bank Data 
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Figure 6. China’s rural population 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
 
However, as China transitioned out of an agricultural-based society and 
gradually shifted its focus to the industry and services sector, demand for labor 
in agriculture has declined significantly. Today, half of the population lives in 
urban areas, and the agriculture sector only comprises less than 3% of total 
employment. Moreover, the extensive use of agricultural machinery has 
substituted human labor and increased agricultural productivity on the farm. As 
a result, families in rural areas who used to produce more children no longer 
need that much labor, and therefore the demand for children in these places has 
gradually decreased over the years.  
 
What else is influencing fertility decisions? 
 
Besides the factors that I have analyzed above, other things could have 
also played an important role in family size decisions. For example, as the One-
child Policy forcibly reduced the number of children born to a couple, women 
had more time to participate in social and economic activities. Traditionally, 
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women contributed to most of the housework and childcare due to the gender 
ideology that viewed men as the primary provider and women as the primary 
homemaker.55 However, according to the 1990 census, the labor participation 
rate among women aged 25 or younger increased significantly since 1980.56 
Presumably, a higher participation rate will lead women to desire fewer children, 
considering that childbearing is a time-consuming activity. Moreover, as women 
choose to put more time and energy into work, the opportunity cost of have 
more children also became higher than what it was thirty years ago. As a result, 
women who are in the workforce today might be less willingly to have more 
children.  
Furthermore, changes in cultural values might have also contributed to a 
lower demand for children. Traditionally, people preferred a large family size for 
various reasons. One was that people wanted more children to provide for their 
old age. Moreover, the traditional preference for a son over a daughter also 
resulted in a large family size since couples sometimes kept producing children 
until they get a son. As the State advocated for a small family culture and 
implemented the family planning policies, these cultural values have changed 
considerably. In 1987, the National Statistical Bureau conducted a survey in nine 
provinces in China regarding the purpose for raising children.57 The data 
revealed that the traditional views about raising children to insure life in old age 
                                                        
55 Zaizai Lu, David J. Maume, and Marcia L. Bellas. "Chinese Husbands' 
Participation in Household Labor." Journal of Comparative Family Studies 31, no. 
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Approaching Lewis Turning Point and Its Policy Implications 1 (2009): 40. 
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and to keep a family name have changed significantly.58  Such changes in cultural 
values might have to some extent facilitated the transition from a large family 
culture to a small family one. 
Another thing that could be taken into account is the growing need for 
eldercare in Chinese families. In China, the proportion of population aged 60 or 
over has reached 16.1% in 2015.59 As family members are now the dominant 
caregivers of elderly people, a smaller family size means that each child is taking 
on more responsibility to take care of their parents, especially since China is still 
in the process of building a comprehensive pension system. This means that 
parents will have less time for childcare and a lower ability to provide for an 
additional child.60 As the single child generation enters their reproductive years, 
they often need to balance between taking care of their parents and providing 
for their children, which could potentially further push down the demand for 
children.  
 
Will the Two-child Policy raise the fertility level? 
 
 So far my analysis has shown how different factors could influence family 
decisions in Chinese families. Some of these factors have changed drastically 
since the implementation of the One-child Policy. While there was a huge 
increase in household income, the rearing cost and the expectation for how much 
one should spent on a child have also risen to a higher level. On one hand, 
                                                        
58 Ibid. 
59 National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistical Communiqué of the People’s 
Republic of China on the 2015 National Economic and Social Development, 2016. 
60 Liao and Zheng, op. cit., p. 43. 
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parents in urban areas are striving to provide a higher standard of living for 
themselves as well as for their children. As a result, they might value the quality 
of their life and of their children more than the quantity of children they have in 
the family. Moreover, higher labor participation rate among women today 
indicates that they have less time for childcare and a higher opportunity cost for 
leaving the job to have a baby, both of which could contribute to a smaller ideal 
family size. On the other hand, as rural population decreased and the machinery 
gradually substituted human labor on the farm, the demand for labor in 
agriculture has declined, leading to lower demand for children among families in 
rural areas. All these changes indicate that the children have become less 
desirable among Chinese families.  
How will this influence the effect of the Two-child Policy? As I pointed out 
earlier, the One-child Policy lowered the demand for children in Chinese families 
by placing a high price on having a second child. Similarly, the Two-child Policy 
could increase the demand by removing the penalties for having a second child. 
As shown in Figure 7, the effect of the Two Child Policy could thus be illustrated 
as a movement down along the demand curve from point B to point C. However, 
my analysis has shown that the demand for children has naturally declined to a 
low level due to a number of reasons, including changes in rearing cost, people’s 
preferences for goods and cultural values. The effects of these changes altogether 
can be illustrated as an inward shift of the demand curve (Dc to Dc’). As a result, 
we might end up getting a level of demand for children that is not much higher 
from when the One-child Policy was in place (illustrated by point D). In other 
words, the Two-child Policy might not have any great impact in terms of 
increasing fertility rate in China.  
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  Figure 7. The Impact of the Two-child Policy on the Demand for Children 
Evidence has suggested that such inward shift of the demand curve is very 
possible. In the 2001 National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Survey, 
the participants were asked about their preferences for the number of children. 
The results showed that 35 percent of the participants preferred one child and 
57 percent preferred two children. However, there was a noticeable difference 
between urban and rural areas. The average number of children desired in 
families in urban areas was only 1.44, compared to an average number of 1.77. In 
addition, more than half of the participants from urban areas indicated that they 
wanted only one child. This difference has important implications because the 
Two-child Policy mainly targets families who live in urban areas, as people were 
already allowed to have more than one child in most rural areas. Thus, if families 
in urban areas do not actually more than one child, then the Two-child Policy 
might not be able to make a difference.  The results also indicated that as 
women’s educational level rises, the preferred number of children becomes 
smaller. Nevertheless, regardless of the areas of residence and the education 
level, very few women (less than 2 percent) wanted more than two children. 
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Assuming that people answered the questions truthfully, the survey suggested 
an overall decrease in the demand for children among Chinese families and a 
reduction in the desired family size. 
 
Source: Ding and Hesketh (2006) 
 
 In fact, a two-child policy has existed in some places in China since the 
mid-1980s. While a strict one-child rule was applied to most areas unless certain 
conditions were satisfied, the government chose four places as experiment 
locations to implement a comprehensive two-child policy. 61 Yicheng, a county in 
Shanxi Province in China where a two-child policy has existed since 1985, has 
been used as an example in many studies to show that China’s current low 
fertility rate is not simply due to the family planning policies.62 Although every 
family was allowed to have up to two children, the fertility rate in Yicheng did 
                                                        
61 Fei Wang, Liqiu Zhao, and Zhong Zhao, "China's Family Planning Policies and 
Their Labor Market Consequences," Journal of Population Economics, Volume 30, 
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62 Yan Wei and Li Zhang, "Re-examination of the Yicheng Two-Child 
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not appear to be much higher than that in other places. In 2000, the fertility rate 
in Yicheng was only about 0.3 points above the national average of 1.5.63  
 
 
In a study regarding the effect of the two-child policy in Yicheng, two 
researchers estimated the birth rate that Yicheng would have had under the one-
child rule using data from other counties of similar socioeconomic conditions in 
the same province, and compared it with the actual birth rate data in Yicheng 
from random samples.64 Figure 8 shows the difference between the actual birth 
rate in Yicheng under the two-child policy, which is represented by the solid line, 
and the projected birth rate that Yicheng would have had under the One-child 
Policy, which is represented by the dotted line. The graph shows that the actual 
birth rate in Yicheng is not very different, if not lower, from the simulated birth 
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64 Wei and Zhang, op. cit.. 
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rate, indicating that the two-child policy did not result in a higher fertility level. 
Again, this study confirms that people now naturally desire fewer children 
regardless of the family planning polices.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
40 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I provided an overview of the family planning policies in 
China and their effects on fertility rates. In particular, I explained how the 
draconian implementation of the One-child Policy changed people’s fertility 
behaviors and reduced the family size. I also examined a series of legislation that 
led to the codification of the One-child Policy and the significance of the adoption 
of the Family Planning Law in 2001. In summary, although it was strictly 
implemented throughout the country since the 1980s, the One-child Policy 
existed without formal legal status for a long time. The State did not enact any 
laws at that time partly because it wanted to avoid international criticism, but 
also because the policy did not rely on any legislative power for its 
implementation. As the CPC dictated law making at that time, the policy was 
directly carried out by Party leaders, government officials, and family planning 
committees at different levels.65 As are result, the policy was already perceived 
as a law before it actually became one, and the adoption of the legislation 
embodying this policy simply confirmed the reality that the public had accepted 
the policy and had become used to a small family culture.   
I then took a close look at the changes in demand for children among 
Chinese families since the implementation of the One-child Policy. My analysis 
showed that the demand for children among Chinese families has declined 
considerably over the years. However, this decrease in demand was not solely 
due to the family planning policies. Changes in income, rearing cost, tastes and 
the expectation for the quality of children have made children less desirable in 
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Chinese families, which lowered the fertility rate to the current level. Moreover, 
there has been a decrease in demand for children among families in rural areas 
where the demand for labor has declined. Thus, as people were forced to have 
only one child for years, they have incorporated such expectation and embodied 
this behavior into their new preferences and values. Consequently, rather than 
choosing to have more children, parents are now more inclined to have fewer 
children, but a higher standard of living for themselves as well as for their 
children.  
While theoretically the removal of the one-child restriction should 
increase the demand for children by reducing the marginal cost of a second child, 
data has shown that the demand for children has naturally decreased to a low 
level among Chinese families. Therefore, it is unlikely that the fertility level will 
rise as a result of the new policy as the changing valuation of children among 
people has led to a decrease in the desired family size. In fact, when the policy 
was relaxed in 2014 to allow some couples who met a certain criteria to have 
more than one child, only 16.8% out of approximately 1.85 million couples who 
were eligible applied for birth certificates for a second birth, reflecting the low 
desirability of children in China today.66 
A big limitation to my analysis is that the data on fertility is not accurate 
since it fails to include unauthorized births in China. During the years when the 
One-child Policy was in place, there were a growing number of unauthorized or 
“out-of-plan” children. This was especially common in rural areas where family 
size was bigger and where regulations were weaker than those in urban areas. 
Parents would hide them from local officials to avoid fines and/or other 
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penalties that they might not be able to afford. Studies have shown that 
unannounced spot checks by the National Statistics Bureau had revealed 
undercounts of up to 40 percent in some rural villages.67 Due to this large 
number of unregistered children, the census figures produced through the 
government’s household registration system might not be the most accurate and 
thus might not reflect the real demand for children among Chinese families. As a 
result, the decrease in demand for children could have been smaller than 
expected, in which case the Two-child policy might have a bigger effect in raising 
the fertility rate.  
This thesis aims to provide information for policymakers, legislators, and 
those who are interested in studying the legal and socioeconomic effects of the 
Chinese family planning policies. After analyzing many important factors 
influencing fertility decisions in China, I found that the Two-child Policy by itself 
might not be enough to raise the fertility rate. The high childrearing cost and the 
cap on the number of children that each family is allowed to have will limit the 
effects of the new policy and keep the fertility rate at a low level.  In order to 
effectively increase fertility and the desirability of children, policymakers and 
legislators might need to consider a more pro-active approach towards the 
problem. Having had a low fertility rate for decades, Japan provides some great 
examples that China can borrow from in terms of policy efforts to raise fertility 
level. Putting an emphasis on lowering the childrearing cost, Japan initiated 
childcare programs and provided child allowance to financially support working 
families with children in order to promote more flexible work environments and 
                                                        
67 Skalla, op. cit., p.357. 
  
 
43 
a more gender-equal society.68 In this way, the government is essentially sharing 
with the parents some of the responsibilities of childrearing to achieve both 
higher productivity and higher fertility. Although not all these policies were very 
successful, they do provide some ideas on different ways of approaching the 
problem of low-fertility and an aging population. 
Of course, this is not to say that China should or will be able to implement 
the same policies as Japan did, considering that these are two countries with 
very different demographic and economic conditions. However, by learning from 
countries that are experiencing similar issues, policymakers in China might be 
able to create a more practical and effective policy package to incentivize people 
to have more children.  
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